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Abstract—The Internet has many backbone components on
top of which the whole world is connected. It is important to
make these components, like Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
Domain Name System (DNS), and Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), secure and work without any interruption. All of the
aforementioned components have vulnerabilities, mainly because
of their dependence on the centralized parties, that should be
resolved.
Blockchain is revolutionizing the concept of today’s Internet,
primarily because of its degree of decentralization and security
properties. In this paper, we discuss how blockchain provides
nearly complete solutions to the open challenges for these network
backbone components.
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O¨z—Du¨nya c¸apında bag˘lantı sag˘layan I˙nternet c¸es¸itli omurga
biles¸enlere sahiptir. Sınır Gec¸idi Protokolu¨ (BGP), Alan Adı
Sistemi (DNS) ve Ac¸ık Anahtar Altyapısı (PKI) gibi biles¸enlerin
gu¨venli hale getirilerek ve kesintisiz c¸alıs¸malarının sag˘lanması.
Bu biles¸enlerin o¨zellikle merkezi otoritelere olan bag˘ımlılıkları
nedeniyle c¸o¨zu¨lmesi gereken zayıf noktaları vardır.
Parc¸a zinciri dag˘ıtık c¸alıs¸ma ve gu¨venlik o¨zellikleri ne-
deniyle gu¨nu¨mu¨zu¨n I˙nternet kavramında devrim yaratan bir
yapıdır. Bu makalede, parc¸a zincirinin belirtilen omurga
biles¸enlerdeki sıkıntılara nasıl neredeyse bu¨tu¨ncu¨l c¸o¨zu¨mler
sundug˘unu tartıs¸ıyoruz.
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler—Parc¸a Zinciri, Blokzincir, I˙nternet, BGP,
DNS, PKI.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first design of the Internet was presented as a centralized
single entity. With time, the Internet was divided into sub-
systems (e.g., DNS, BGP, PKI). Still, these components were
built on a centralized architecture. This introduces security,
privacy, and performance issues such as a single point of failure,
trust issues, high latencies, and storage [1]. This results in these
centralized services getting hacked frequently. Efforts were put
in to make the services distributed [2]. These improved the
Internet by solving the above-mentioned challenges but intro-
duced new types of issues like scheduling, resource allocation,
coordination, device management, scalability, security, trust,
and multiple weak points of contact for attackers [2]. The
overall performance was decreased because of the replication
of work, backups, and the communication of distributed parts
of the overall system [2]. Recently, blockchain-based solutions
were introduced, with the goal being improving security while
keeping the speed, cost and correctness comparable to the
legacy components presented in Table I. We can see that
the current protocols take less time and cost (as most of the
Table I: Legacy Protocol Performance
Protocol Time perquery Security Correctness Cost
DNS 0.048s 1 Needsimprovement High Low
BGP
38s
for 100%
propagation
2 Needs
improvement High Low
PKI Within fewmilliseconds
3 Needs
improvement High Low
vendors have already implemented them) and achieve the de-
sired (correct) results. For example, DNS protocol will always
give the IP (Internet Protocol) address of the domain name,
unless it malfunctions or is attacked. But the security of these
components is vulnerable to the attacks and should be improved
as described in sections III to V.
A blockchain is a public distributed ledger that can record
transactions that are connected using a cryptographic hash
function [3]. The basic functionality provided by a blockchain is
a secure mechanism for storing and obtaining data, ordered by
the timestamp of each record in the data, in a publicly verifiable
and immutable manner. For that reason, in most of the system
architectures, blockchain provides a storage mechanism for
data collection and consensus among participants. In general,
blockchain can help in (1) decentralization, (2) provenance and
immutability of data, (3) security, and (4) heterogeneity and
programmability.
Our contributions: In this paper, we first overview the
blockchain technology, then provide a discussion of three
widely-employed Internet components (PKI, BGP, DNS) and
their security vulnerabilities, afterward showing a detailed
explanation of the available blockchain-based solutions, and
conclude with a summary and open issues.
II. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
A blockchain is a decentralized, distributed, and public
digital ledger that records data in the form of transactions across
multiple devices to enforce immutability, except with a very
1https://wp-rocket.me/blog/test-dns-server-response-time-troubleshoot-site-
speed
2http://www.circleid.com/posts/how a routing prefix travels through
the internet
3https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/option explicit/2012/04/19/validating-
a-certificate/
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small probability of the adversary controlling a large fraction of
the processing power, stake, etc. A blockchain can be split into
network, consensus, storage, view, and side planes [4], enabling
researchers to work on a single idea while improving the overall
blockchain infrastructure.
Hash Function: Blockchain is built upon collision-resistant
deterministic hash functions that map an arbitrary-length input
to a fixed-length n-bit output. The hash function should have
the property of collision resistance, meaning that an adversary
cannot find two different inputs mapping to the same output
in polynomial time. This property is important for the integrity
and immutability of blockchain.
Transactions and Blocks: The ’transaction’ term was first
used by Bitcoin [3], where a transaction contains the amount
of Bitcoin value transferred between entities and information
of the sender and the receiver. Generally, a transaction is data
or information of the variant type and can be created by any
participant.
Blocks are created by the verifiers (miners). A block is a set
of approved transactions, along with a timestamp and a hash
pointer to the previous block. The first block of a blockchain is
called the Genesis Block. The genesis block is almost always
hardcoded with a verifiable universal fact and does not refer to a
previous block. As shown in Figure 1 hashes of all transactions
are kept in a Merkle tree for efficient memory management
[5]. For example Hash0 is the hash of transaction Tx0, Hash1
is the hash of transaction Tx1, Hash01 is the hash of Hash0
and Hash1, and eventually we have the Merkle root hash
Tx Root. The block also contains the hash of the previous block
(prev hash). Thus, it is computationally infeasible to modify or
tamper with the contents of the previous blocks, as this would
require finding the hash of all of the remaining blocks to keep
the chain connected.
Types of Blockchains. In a blockchain, entities can be
readers or writers (writers can be of two types, data owners,
who create transactions, and verifiers, who create blocks). De-
pending on the permissions of these entities, a blockchain can
be divided into two groups. In Permissionless Blockchain, an
entity does not require permission to become a reader or writer
like Bitcoin [3] and Zerocash [6]. Whereas in Permissioned
Blockchain, a centralized entity grants permission to the users
to be the readers or writers (e.g., Hyperledger [7]).
Consensus Protocols. Blockchain presents a solution for the
environment where the parties do not have to trust each other
and collaborate. As there is no universal trusted third party, each
blockchain has to have a consensus protocol for reliability and
consistent state of the network.
Proof of Work (PoW): In PoW, a node can get its block
accepted if it can solve a cryptographic puzzle (hash) and
spend some computational resources in the process. It was first
implemented by Bitcoin [3].
Proof of Stake (PoS): A node is randomly selected depend-
ing upon the stake/resources (ether in Etherium [8]) she has.
Then its block is accepted to be appended to the chain.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT): In Practical BFT (PBFT)
[9], there is a leader election (where each entity participates)
to elect an entity that has authority to add a new transaction in
Figure 1: Sample blockchain blocks and transactions.
the chain. This protocol assumes that there more than 2/3 of
the honest participants. In Delegated BFT (DBFT) [10], partic-
ipants, by voting, pick the delegate they support. The selected
delegates, through the BFT algorithm, reach a consensus and
generate new blocks.
Problems. Blockchain presents a new perspective on Internet
security, but the traditional Bitcoin blockchain (which is used
as the solutions discussed in the upcoming sections show)
still has issues regarding huge power, energy, storage, and
communication requirements [11] (current Bitcoin blockchain
is around 200 GB). Moreover, the Bitcoin blockchain is secure
assuming that more than 50% of the hashing power belongs to
the honest parties in the system. There are further attacks on
the incentive mechanism, such as selfish mining [12].
III. PKI
Earlier, anyone could pretend to be anybody over the Internet
as none of the Internet layers verifies the identity of the entity
over the network. This created privacy and trust issues. As
a solution, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) were introduced. The concept is to provide data
integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity using a public/private
key pair. But these keys can be compromised. Then another
idea was introduced to create cryptographic identities known
as digital certificates. Digital certificates contain the identity
and public keys of the entity to be used for encryption and
authentication. The problem remained that it is very easy to
create a digital certificate by self-signing it. There was a
need of having a trusted third party that can provide these
certificates, now known as a Certificate Authority (CA). CA is
a trusted entity that issues digital certificates that verify a digital
entity’s identity over the Internet. The infrastructure to manage,
store and distribute these certificates is called the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
A CA signs a certificate to bind the public key of a server to
its identity. Then SSL/TLS uses these certificates to authenticate
the web-server. Trusting the CA, the browser obtains the
server’s public key to establish a secure connection. There
are two types of certificate authorities ROOT-CA and SUB-
CA. The certificate is trusted if it is signed by ROOT-CA.
The browsers or operating systems come with many ROOT-
CA public keys stored in their databases. As ROOT-CAs might
be limited in number and become bottle-neck when there is a
lot of demand, there are SUB-CAs that can sign the certificates.
PKI works on Chain of Trust. To authenticate a certificate,
the browser (or any other entity) checks whether or not the
certificate is signed by a valid ROOT-CA. If the signer is a
SUB-CA, the validation continues in a chain up to the ROOT-
CA. Recent research indicates that CAs can be dishonest, get
attacked, or can be using faulty or outdated cryptographic
algorithms [13]. Which effects the security of PKI.
Currently, there are two types of approaches for the security
of PKI. Log Based PKI: Highly available servers are appointed
for publishing and secure monitoring of the certificates to
ensure that CAs do not behave maliciously. Still, there are issues
with log-based solutions like revocation explained in [14]. Web
of Trust (WoT): is a decentralized approach. Users can put
their trust in another entity by signing their certificate. Then
each trusted entity keeps a certificate that contains signatures
of the users that trusted it, in addition to its public key.
Limitations of PKI security and the advantages of using
blockchain to enhance the security and efficacy of PKI is given
by [15]. The architecture assumes the existence of blockchain-
backed PKI and uses it to secure the critical (rich) credentials. A
privacy-aware PKI system based on blockchain was presented
by [16]. The paper claims that there are many instances (like
anonymous social forums), where the entity does not want to re-
veal its identity. Current PKI leaks this information by knowing
which key is used in the protocol. The paper uses blockchain
to have online and offline keys and encryption to hide the
identity of the user. [17] proposes Etherium-based blockchain
technology to build secure PKI systems, resolving the issues of
log-based PKI and the WoT approaches. Blockchain resolves
the single point of failure issue and the need for a newcomer
to prove its trustworthiness.
Certificate Transparency (CT) was introduced by [18],
using an append-only public log, to improve the accountability
of CAs. As certificates are publicly recorded in the log servers, a
fraudulent certificate can be detected, and the countermeasures
can be taken to handle the potential attack. Though this removes
the central authenticating entity [18], considering the increas-
ingly huge number of current certificates, it may introduce
computation and communication burden on both clients and
servers [19]. Moreover, it is shown that split-world attack can
be performed on CT [20], where the attacker presents different
views of the log to successfully impersonate as the victim.
Another issue with CT is that it is not a privacy-preserving
scheme [21]. Certificate Revocation is another phenomenon that
reduces the efficacy of these solutions as stale certificates can
be used by attackers [20].
[22] gives an approach to detect the man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack happened/happening to a victim client. The
concept of notary nodes is used, where the server connects and
requests the observation of its certificate. In [23] public notaries
are used by the client, hence replacing the dependence on the
web browsers/operating systems to validate the certificates. In
[22], the MITM can be detected but cannot be prevented, and
in [23], the users still have to rely on the notaries (which can
all be compromised).
[13] proposes a blockchain-based solution to construct
certificate transparency. The certificates are published as trans-
actions in a global blockchain by the web servers, which is
downloaded by browsers. To verify a certificate, the browser
just has to see if the certificate is in the blockchain. As the
certificates of the authorities are also published, the CAs are
also publicly accountable. This creates more trust and decreases
the possibility of having a fraudulent CA. Each certificate has
a period of validity and can be revoked at will by omitting
it from the next block and hence putting into a certificate
revocation list (CRL). In this solution, compromised CA can
be detected two ways. One is that other CAs will not approve
of its transactions. Secondly, the target server will only publish
the certificates from valid CAs and the fraudulent certificates
will not be appended to the global chain. As the attacker fails
to impersonate the target server, a wrong certificate will not
be publicized even if the Publishing Key Pair is compromised.
In the case both PK and CA are compromised, the counter-
measures are taken within a period before the certifiers certify
the change. Still, the attacker may prevent the browser from
obtaining the blockchain, which is difficult in such a distributed
setting. Second, there can be forks introduced but unless more
than 1/3 of the certifiers are malicious, then this is not possible
either [13]. However, this scheme has the following drawbacks
identified in [20]:
1) An adversary can use unexpired transactions of the re-
voked certificate to impersonate the victim server; this is
a type of a man-in-the-middle attack.
2) The proposal is inefficient in terms of storage and has
large headers.
3) The proposal depends on the CAs to publish revocation
information of the certificate to the blockchain but the
compromised CA might not issue Certificate Revocation
information to the public.
CertLedger [20] provides a solution that is resilient to split-
world attacks, does not depend on CA for the certificate
revocation, and preserves the privacy of the clients.
Open Issues: There are still some issues like what is the
incentive for the certifiers? What if honest nodes are compro-
mised after joining? What happens when the key pair of the
server is compromised?
IV. BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL (BGP)
Autonomous Systems (AS) are responsible for the routing
among their network typologies. Typically, an AS represents a
collection of IP prefixes to which data is routed [24]. Sometimes
these ASes require a flow of data among themselves to reach
the destination not present within individual networks. This
data flow is peer-to-peer (P2P) in its nature, and is done
through the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [25]. In BGP, an
AS announces the IP prefix of all the IPs reachable through
itself, together with path delay metrics. All the other Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) behind ASes update their routing
tables according to the BGP announcement. Although efficient
in practice, ASes assume that their neighboring ASes behave
honestly and propagate correct routing information (without
having the global knowledge). However, the interests of ASes
may conflict, and this weak notion of trust can be breached by
malicious ASes (e.g. prefix hijacking [24]).
Previous efforts have developed many solutions like Secure
BGP (S-BGP) [26], Secure Origin BGP (SoBGP) [27], Inter-
domain Route Validation (IRV) [28] and Path-End Validation
[29]. Each of them depends upon a central trusted entry, which
has a huge cost of management and is complex. Also, these
solutions depend upon the PKI, which has the vulnerabilities
described in the previous section. Another problem is the lack of
adoption of these protocols as they introduce costly additional
infrastructure for their operation. To avoid the cost of adoption,
ASes and ISPs are reluctant to migrate towards these solutions
despite the known security threats and their clear benefits.
BGP is open to different kinds of attacks. In BGP route
manipulation attack, an adversary manages to change the BGP
table to disrupt the traffic of the Internet. Whereas in BGP route
hijacking, an attacker AS announces the prefixes belonging to
the victim. As a result, the traffic is re-routed to or through the
attacker AS. An attacker can also send malicious or faulty BGP
traffic to a victim. The victim exhausts its resources to handle
the traffic and is left incapable of processing valid BGP traffic.
In Route Leak, as the result of a potential attack or the AS
malfunction, an AS issues incorrect information about the IP
addresses on their network. This results in inefficient routing
and failures for the traffic.
BGP route hijacking is most dangerous and can be classified
into two types: partial attack and complete attack [30]. The
partial attack occurs when an adversarial AS announces an
identical IP prefix as that of the victim AS. Attack on Youtube
in 2008 [24] is an example of partial hijacking. In a complete
attack, the adversary AS announces more specific prefixes than
the target AS. Since the default forwarding is based on the
longest prefix matching, ASes switch to more specific prefixes
and start sending the packet through that route. [30]. Figure
2 explains the difference between the attacks. In the partial
attack, an attacker would announce the 208.65.153.0/24, which
is already announced by AS1. Since the two announcements
are the same, when any other AS receives the announcement,
it can either switch to it or continue with the old routing
path. In the complete attack, an attacker would announce
208.65.153.128/25. This IP has a longer prefix match than
208.65.153.0/24 in the respective finger (for example see finger
table of AS3 in Fig. 2b) tables so other ASes would switch
to this route. Interestingly, Youtube used the same concept as
a legitimate way to get back the traffic in the 2008 attack
[30]. Some BGP attack examples include a global route leak in
November 2017, a country-wide Internet outage in Japan due
to BGP issues in August 2017, and possible financial traffic
re-routing in April 2017.4
Blockchain-based Solutions: One effort towards securing
BGP was to use the PKI presented by IANA [31] to sign
the routes. This scheme is problematic as to effectively use
PKI, ASes set up a route assigning authority called Routing
Origin Authorization (ROA) which is very costly to implement.
Also, as we constructed that PKI infrastructure has security
4https://securityintelligence.com/bgp-internet-routing-what-are-the-threats/
Fig. 2a: Partial Attack Fig. 2b: Complete Attack
Figure 2: Difference between prefix high-jack attacks
vulnerabilities (section III), signed BGP update messages based
on PKI signatures in BGPSec do not result in a secure path
verification protocol.
Considering the mentioned problems and the properties of
blockchain discussed in Section II, [31] gives a structure of
a system that uses blockchain for the better security and
performance of BGP. Blockchain helps in the following ways:
1) All transactions occur between peers without any interme-
diary (like ROA). Also, there is no need for a third party
to authentication, eliminating the possibility of tampering
or spoofing by a malicious entity.
2) Provides announcement immutability and re-traceability
of the chain of BGP routes. Also, a route is validated by
multiple parties and is more trustworthy.
3) The authors argue that the blockchain should be different
from the Bitcoin blockchain and its properties should
depend upon the nature of the use case.
The paper does not provide an implementation and do not
discuss the possible attacks and the prevention.
The authors in [24] present a clique-based BGP architecture,
RouteChain, to secure BGP against both complete and partial
attacks. The method distributes the ASes into subgroups. The
system has a global blockchain, and each subgroup has its
own private-permissioned blockchain. The main purpose of this
sharding is to reduce the storage overhead of having only one
global chain and to decrease the transaction validation which
is critical for the timely detection of a potential attack. The
ASes are grouped based on their geographical proximity for
low delays. All groups select a leader to randomly to announce
the local routes to the global chain. They use local collaboration
among ASes to prevent the complete attack. Whenever there is
an update, all the ASes in the group check if their path changes
with the update. If it does, they observe the original path and
its corresponding prefix. Next, they locate the true owner of the
prefix through the global blockchain. If the new update does
not belong to the true owner, then the update is discarded. The
paper claims that the consensus in the partial attack scenario
is achieved in 200 milliseconds, and it is 54.23 seconds for
the complete attack. Comparing this timing with the attack on
Youtube hijacking incident (in which within 20 minutes, 97
ASes were hijacked) RouteChain asserts that the system will
notify the ASes about the attack while it is in its initial stages
[24]. The protocol runs on top of the current BGP architecture,
which makes it adaptable and economical.
Open Issues: In BGP, different ASes have different policies
for sharing the route with the other AS or not. For example,
if AS1 does not want its traffic to go through AS2, then AS1
will advertise the path that does not include AS2 even if the
resultant path is longer. How can blockchain solutions cater to
these policies? Can different blockchain architectures be used
to solve the BGP security issues?
V. DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (DNS)
The domain name system is used for the resolution of the
global domain names. It has a distributed hierarchical design
with one root server and 13 specialized servers operated by
agencies within a few parts of the world. This design made
the system simple, scalable, and flexible. The (in)security of
DNS leads to many advanced attacks on DNS including DNS
spoofing/cache poisoning, DNS hijacking, and DNS rebinding.
A DNS DDoS attack in October 2016 brought down many of
the websites including Netflix, Twitter, and CNN [39].
DNSSec is crucial for providing origin authentication and
message integrity to communication between the user and the
name server. In DNSSec, the root server sends the certificate
containing the public key of the next name server along with the
IP address of the next server and the hash of the entire message
(for data integrity). The next server does the same until the IP
address for the domain name is found. This protocol solves the
problem of authentication and integrity but still suffers from
various attacks namely IP fragmentation and DDoS. The most
major problem is its slow adoption.
Blockchain-based DNS Alternatives: Namecoin [34] was
built with the motivation of removing managing domains to
avoid trust in a single entity. Namecoin uses different prefixes to
store and map other types of name-value pairs. For example, the
“d/” prefix is used for domain names and “id/” is used to register
identities. It further uses the virtual .bit top-level domain name
that is not officially registered in the current DNS system. This
means Namecoin is isolated from the DNS system and users
have to install additional resolving software for resolution of the
.bit domain names. Just like DNS, Namecoin provides complete
functionalities for registering, renewing, and transferring a
domain. The developers modified Bitcoin blockchain to store
name-value data like transactions, still utilizing the PoW-based
mining mechanism for consensus. Namecoin has shown to have
some security flaws: for instance, it was found that a single
miner consistently had more than 51% of the total computing
power on the Namecoin network [33]. In another instance, a
Namecoin bug allowed people to steal names from anyone
[33]. Performance-vise, [33] experienced a latency spike and
throughput drop due to software issues of Namecoin.
Blockstack [33] combines a DNS system with PKI and purely
works with the Bitcoin blockchain. To improve the efficiency of
the Bitcoin blockchain for handling a large amount of name-
value pairs, a separate logical layer, namely virtual chain, is
proposed that works on top of the blockchain to maintain
the naming system while the underlying blockchain is only
used for achieving consensus on the state of the DNS (or any
naming system in general) and the integrity of the name-value
data records. Blockstack has significant improvements over
Namecoin as it increases the data storage capacity considerably
and the virtual chain improves the maintenance of the system.
In [39], authors use blockchain to improve the security and
performance of DNSSec. The solution decreases the number
of keys needed for DNSSec for easy key management and
reduction in DNSSec response size. They use the X509 Cloud
blockchain network that is used to store X.509 certificates. This
allows us to speed up the verification process.
DecDNS [35] gives a blockchain based data storage model
for DNS. They also build multiple DNS nodes for further
decentralization and addressing single-point-of-failure in DNS
resolution. They report 0.006025s response for parallel domain
name resolution, which satisfies the DNS performance require-
ments and shows the potential of using the architecture in the
real network for domain name resolutions.
Open Issues: There should be compatibility between the
traditional and the blockchain-based DNS architectures for
the systems using the conventional methods for DNS, as this
leaves performance and security concerns. For example, a query
from the blockchain-backed DNS system can be misinterpreted
or discarded by a system using a legacy DNS mechanism.
How can blockchain-based and traditional DNS mechanisms
inter-operate and integrate? This area of the combination of
blockchain-based and traditional decentralization mechanisms
for name resolution requires more research.
VI. COMPARISON
We finish with an analysis of the mentioned blockchain-
based solutions using three main parameters. Security: The
level of integrity, confidentiality, and availability introduced
by the proposed solutions. Performance: The performance of
these solutions compared to the legacy solutions. Resource
Constraints: The speed, storage, and cost constraints involved.
Table IIa gives an overview of the proposed solutions per-
protocol regarding the analysis parameters.
In Table IIb, we identified the key security aspects between
blockchain in general and the currently deployed protocols.
Blockchain provides Data integrity by the use of hashing in
block construction backed by the public key cryptography
(as discussed in Section II) to create trust between trustless
entities under the same system.. The blockchain excels in
availability as the ledger is distributed globally on different
nodes offering robustness against the single point of failure
problem. Further, blockchain provides fault tolerance, i.e., even
if some participants leave the system, fail, or get attacked, the
blockchain system is not affected as each participant has (more
or less) the same copy of the ledger.
Looking at the drawbacks, we can see that the contents of
the records in blockchain are transparent and costs confiden-
tiality to the users considering to opt for blockchain solutions.
Furthermore, as discussed in [11], blockchain requires lots of
storage and computational resources, which come at a high cost
and decreased scalability. Furthermore, the blockchain can be
attacked (for example using selfish mining [12]). With the ever-
increasing use of the Internet, this issue needs to be solved using
better optimizations of currently available blockchain systems,
such as LightChain [42].
Table II: Overall analysis of blockchain based solutions
Protocol Solutions Hashed Data Security Performance
Resources
Constraints
PKI [32], [33], [34],[35], [20] TLS Certificates Improved Comparable
Storage and
computational costs
DNS [36], [37], [38], [39] Domain Names Improved Comparable Same as of blockchain
BGP [40], [31], [41] Domain Routes Improved Comparable Storage and speed
a: Blockchain based solutions summary
Security Features Blockchain Legacy Systems
Integrity High Medium
Availability High Medium
Confidentiality Low Medium
Fault Tolerance HIgh High
No. of Trustless Nodes High Low
b: Security Comparison
VII. CONCLUSION
Blockchain is an emerging solution for improving the se-
curity of the overall structure of the Internet to ensure the
interruption-free performance of the network. In this paper,
we presented blockchain-based solutions for three core network
components and systems: PKI, BGP, and DNS, and identified
open problems. We plan to further extend our cryptographic
discussion with the knowledge we gained from [43].
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